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EVALUATING COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES V. BUNNELL AND THE ROLE OF RAM UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ON E-DISCOVERY
Loren M. Hall1
©Loren M. Hall
Abstract
In 2007, the District Court for the Central District of California required the preservation of data stored in
random access memory (RAM), which sparked significant commentary about the rapidly expanding realm of
electronically-stored discoverable information. This Article addresses the impact of Columbia Pictures
Industries v. Bunnell in the context of the duty to preserve and produce documents, and the scope of
information that can be subject to e-discovery obligations. This Article also describes how the 2006
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a necessary limitation—reasonableness—on the
costly and unrealistic preservation, and subsequent production, of electronic information. Furthermore, this
Article discusses how Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell, like several other recent federal court cases
involving e-discovery, fits within a broader trend in e-discovery litigation that recognizes new forms of
electronic information with the same limits of reasonableness. It closes by reviewing the important reminders
given by Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell, including future trends and the need for data retention
policies.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>Technology has changed the way information is stored and communicated. Today, the type of information
subject to electronic discovery (e-discovery) under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure varies greatly in terms of
volume, range, and how such information may be deleted.2  Managing electronic information in anticipation of
1
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litigation, evaluating the costs of production during litigation, and protecting privileged material are all factors
that make e-discovery potentially time-consuming and difficult.3
<2>As the law of e-discovery continues to evolve, a pertinent question remains as to the scope of a party’s duty
to preserve discoverable electronically-stored information. The case of Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell
brought that question to the forefront of the legal community.4  In Bunnell, a federal magistrate ordered a
defendant to preserve and produce server logs that contained data stored in random access memory (RAM);5
the decision was upheld by the district court.6  The conclusion that data stored in RAM was discoverable garnered
the attention of legal press, which noted that the decision could make preservation of data “extraordinarily
burdensome,”7  cause “e-discovery anarchy,”8  or potentially “open up a landslide of new discovery obligations.”9
<3>Nevertheless, the Bunnell decision is unique in its treatment of data stored in RAM, and does not greatly
change the nature of e-discovery or indicate a trend toward unmanageable duties of preservation in civil
litigation. This Article discusses the Bunnell decision within the context of the 2006 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the duties of preservation and production. After analyzing Bunnell alongside other
developments in e-discovery case law, this Article demonstrates that Bunnell falls within the existing e-discovery
framework. Though novel, Bunnell is dependent upon its facts, and fits within a broader trend in e-discovery that
recognizes new forms of electronic information while still limiting the expansion of preservation and production by
what is “reasonable.”
BRIEF HISTORY OF E-DISCOVERY AND THE 2006 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
<4>Both Congress and the courts have recognized the need to amend the rules of discovery to account for
changes in technology affecting the storage of information. Since the amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to include electronic data within the definition of “documents,”10  courts have interpreted these rules to
protect producing parties from undue burden and expense. However, the courts have also continued to expand
the scope of the type of information that must be preserved.11  Moreover, the courts have also addressed the
challenges in e-discovery in several landmark cases by developing new tests for determining accessibility and
allocating costs.12
<5>Facing these developments, the federal judiciary’s Civil Rules Advisory Committee amended the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to better accommodate the information age. The Supreme Court approved the amended rules
on April 12, 2006,13  and changed the federal civil discovery rules in several significant ways. For instance, the
types of electronic data related to core litigation issues had outgrown their categorization as a type of
“document,” and as such, the committee recognized “electronically stored information” as being apart from other
“documents.”14  Other changes included the following: (1) a requirement that the parties meet early in litigation
to discuss and plan for electronic discovery;15  (2) new rules addressing the production of information that is not
reasonably accessible;16  (3) review of privileged content;17  (4) adequate forms of production;18  and (5)
appropriate sanctions for discovery violations.19
<6>Decided after these new rules became effective, the Bunnell decision reflects the technological developments
that brought about the changes in the rules. Within the new rules framework, Bunnell involves three key issues:
the duty to preserve documents, the obligation to produce such documents, and the scope of information that
can be subject to e-discovery obligations.
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DUTIES AND PROCEDURES: THE BACKGROUND OF COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES V. BUNNELL
<7>Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell is a case that involves technology, which provides a rich setting to
address issues regarding e-discovery rules. Defendant Bunnell operated TorrentSpy, a Web site featuring a search
engine that allowed users to search, locate, and download dot-torrent files.20  The search engine, along with the
appropriate software and network of users, facilitated the copying and distribution of music, film, and other files
sought by the users.21  The plaintiffs alleged that these files were unauthorized copies of copyrighted material,22
and that TorrentSpy knowingly enabled and profited from the sharing of copyrighted films and television
programs.23
<8>Columbia Pictures filed a motion seeking an order that Bunnell preserve and produce a number of records that
would give information on the users who had accessed the site, including the types of files searched for, shared,
and the dates of the relevant transactions.24  Due to the nature of TorrentSpy’s online business model, the
requested data was temporarily stored in its systems’ RAM; the data would be archived in server data logs only if
necessary.25  Because federal courts had never before ordered data stored in RAM to be preserved and produced,
the court faced a novel issue in e-discovery: whether information stored in RAM constituted discoverable
electronically-stored information, and whether preservation and production of such stored information was
required by law. In spite of facing an original legal scenario, the resulting court order fit well within developed
case law on the duty to preserve electronic evidence and the limits on its production during discovery.
The Duty to Preserve
<9>In general, if information is relevant to a dispute, parties have a duty to preserve evidence once litigation is
reasonably anticipated.26  In response to this obligation, companies often initiate a “litigation hold” preventing the
destruction of potentially discoverable material.27  In tangible document terms, this means that the party must
stop shredding hard copy files. In cases of e-discovery, this can become an affirmative duty to enable or enhance
the party’s existing preservation policies or controls, which are often implemented through networked technology
systems.
<10>Failure to perform this affirmative duty where necessary may be considered “spoliation,” or the destruction
of evidence during pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.28  In cases of spoliation, a party may request
that the court impose sanctions on the other party if it believes that the non-moving party is breaching its duty
to preserve relevant evidence.29  Sanctions can range from fines to termination of the lawsuit with prejudice,
depending on the severity of the spoliation.30
<11>To prevent onerous and expensive affirmative burdens of preservation for businesses during their ordinary
day-to-day operations, the new rules also include a “safe harbor” provision in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37(f). The rule relevantly states that, “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine,
good-faith operation of an electronic information system.”31  Thus, the provision prohibits courts from penalizing
organizations for the routine destruction of electronic information prior to the onset of litigation. In Bunnell, for
example, the federal magistrate judge refused to grant the plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions, citing Rule 37(f) and
the lack of precedent directly on point that could support a finding that destruction of RAM data information was
done in bad faith and in violation of TorrentSpy’s preservation obligations.32
<12>Despite this application of the safe harbor in Bunnell, parties should avoid relying too heavily upon its
protection. The provision will not protect improper destruction of records once litigation is reasonably
3
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anticipated.33  Also, the provision is relatively untested and its full effect on e-discovery remains contested.34
Moreover, its protection may be limited to the use of systems that, in regular operation, delete, overwrite, or
alter certain types of relevant data, such as RAM.35  Nevertheless, the addition of Rule 37(f) does limit the duty
of preservation by recognizing the lawfulness of routine electronic data destruction. This indicates that although
more types of data may be called into court, the rules provide reasonable limits on what needs to be preserved
and produced.
Defining the Scope of Discoverability
<13>Even if electronic evidence is properly preserved prior to litigation, a court may elect not to require its
production. The Rules provide courts with numerous factors to consider when deciding if electronic data must be
produced for the opposing party during discovery. These factors include the relevance of the data to the issues
litigated,36  and whether the data is so important as to outweigh the costs or burdens associated with its
inaccessibility.37
<14>The test of relevancy, like that for all potentially discoverable material, is rooted in the rules of evidence.38
If this test is met, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) additionally provides that it can be subject to a
production request: “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense . . . .”39  However, the test for what constitutes “reasonably accessible,” and which party
should bear the costs of producing inaccessible evidence is not articulated in the rules themselves. As such,
courts have imposed their own parameters.
<15>For example, in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg,40  the District Court for the Southern District of New York
classified data as being either “relatively accessible” or “relatively inaccessible,” depending on how it is stored.
Each category also has its own sub-categories. Relatively accessible data is data that is kept in an accessible
format, which includes active, online, or hard drive data. In addition, accessible data also involves data that is
retained as near-line data, which includes information on optical disks or an offline storage archive. By contrast,
relatively inaccessible data includes backup tapes and erased, fragmented, or damaged data.41  The Zubulake
Court used these categories of accessibility and other factors to decide whether the costs of production may be
shifted from the producing party to the requesting party.42
<16>The 2006 amendments utilize the Zubulake decision’s language on accessibility to limit the scope of
discoverable information. Indeed, the rules now create a similar categorized system. Information that is deemed
not reasonably accessible by the responding party must only be produced if the requesting party can
demonstrate “good cause” and reasonableness; “good cause” is based upon relevancy and a determination that
the material is not overly duplicative of other reasonably accessible data.43
<17>For example, in Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Liberman,44  the plaintiff employer alleged that former
employee defendant had sabotaged the plaintiffs’ business.45  In response, the defendant claimed that any of the
defendant’s lost sales were due to poor business management, and requested production of hundreds of
thousands of electronic documents to prove this alleged fact. Facing that request, the plaintiff asserted that the
documents requested were not reasonably accessible. After consideration, the federal district court concluded that
there was not “good cause” to justify a request because the request was not specifically tailored to produce
relevant documents.46
<18>Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Liberman, among others, also demonstrates that simply because data fits
4
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within the duty of preservation (i.e., it is electronically stored information that is reasonably related to the
litigation), does not mean that its production will be required during discovery. Rather, the policy interests of
accessing more types of information due to technological advancement, is balanced by the goal of preventing
disproportionate burdens on litigants.47  Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell arose in this unique balancing context.
WHERE COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES V. BUNNELL FITS WITHIN THE AMENDED FEDERAL RULES’ REALM OF
REASONABILITY
<19>In Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell, the magistrate judge first addressed whether the data stored in RAM fit
within the scope of discovery at all. In other words, whether data stored in RAM constituted relevant evidence
that could be discoverable if it qualified as “electronically stored information.”48  The magistrate judge determined
that, without question, this data passes the relevancy test because it would identify the instances and culprits of
copyright violations.49  The parties disagreed, however, as to whether RAM fit within the scope of “electronically
stored information” and, therefore, could be required to be produced during discovery.50
<20>As the court noted, RAM had previously been recognized as a type of storage that could be the basis for
liability.51  Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not address the discoverability of RAM information in
MAI Systems Corporation v. Peak Computers, the court of appeals reasoned that because the defendant was able
to use software loaded in its computer systems’ RAM, such use was considered “copying” the software and,
therefore, a violation of the license agreement between the plaintiff and defendant.52  Since information copied in
RAM could be the basis of legal liability, the magistrate court in Bunnell reasoned it should also qualify as
electronically stored information for the purposes of discovery.53  Although RAM may be more temporary than
other forms of computer memory, the Bunnell Court concluded that RAM should also be included as a type of
storage appropriate for production during discovery.54
<21>In addition to RAM, TorrentSpy and its affiliates also had Web server logs at their disposal.55  Through the
use of its server logs, TorrentSpy could have permanently stored the discoverable data that had been temporarily
stored in RAM.56  It is this “fixing” of the RAM to a more permanent medium that helped bring the information
contained in the RAM within the range of being electronically stored information, and subjected it to
production.57
<22>It is worth noting that requiring the discovery of the server logs themselves was not novel because such
logs had already been found discoverable when under control of third parties in Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-
20.58  Arista Records, like Bunnell, involved alleged copyright infringement by Internet users and a motion by the
plaintiffs to compel the production of user information on Web server logs.59  Furthermore, at least one court has
previously found that where reports or documents have been destroyed, but could have been recreated through
data still in electronic storage, such data is also discoverable.60
<23>If TorrentSpy had not been capable of “fixing” the relevant data, the court probably would not have required
its preservation or production. Indeed, the court proceeded to distinguish Bunnell’s facts from those in Convolve,
Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., where the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the loss
of certain computer data obtained during routine tuning and re-calibrating of devices was not spoliation.61  The
measurement data at issue in Convolve, Inc., much like RAM, was not permanent unless recorded separately.62
However, unlike Bunnell, the defendant in Convolve, Inc. did not have an equivalent server-log system with the
capability to permanently store the data.63
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<24>In weighing these competing forms of data and accessibility, the magistrate court also considered the
potential burden placed on the defendants to maintain the data in its Web server logs, and produce it for the
plaintiffs. Finding that the cost weighed in favor of the plaintiffs requests, the court held that RAM constituted
“electronically stored information” and that it would be reasonable for the defendant to produce RAM during
discovery.64  As such, the defendant was required to produce the records upon a showing of good cause and by
court order; however, the court initially declined to order sanctions for not archiving the records in the server
logs prior to the order because the defendant could not be faulted for not preserving the data prior to the court
order.65
<25>Nevertheless, following further discovery by the parties, the district court found that the defendants, in fact,
willfully committed spoliation of evidence when it deleted and modified its user forums postings, directory
headings, user Internet Provider (IP) addresses, and identities and addresses of its Web site moderators.66
Concluding that the defendants “engaged in widespread and systematic efforts to destroy evidence and have
provided false testimony under oath in an effort to hide evidence of such destruction,” the court granted the
plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions terminating the lawsuit in their favor.67
<26>Thus, Bunnell demonstrates that courts will consider whether the burden of production outweighs the
likelihood of revealing relevant evidence.68  Had Bunnell convinced the court that the burden of preserving and
producing the records was prohibitively high, the court may have limited the production order or required the
plaintiff to share in the costs of its production. Regardless, federal courts have established that the costs of
preservation and production should not exceed the amount in controversy,69  and that cost shifting between
parties is necessary where justified.70
<27>Finally, the court’s ruling also highlights the dangers of failing to retain relevant and reasonably accessible
data, or destroying such evidence following the commencement of litigation. Although Bunnell may be novel in its
focus on RAM, after closer scrutiny, the case falls well within the recognized boundaries of the realm of
reasonability. Indeed, Bunnell fits comfortably within the framework of expanding e-discovery obligations based
on the amended rules and recent case law.
GOING WITH THE FLOW: BROADENING THE SCOPE OF DISCOVERABLE EVIDENCE
<28>Historically, the bulk of initial e-discovery issues involved e-mail and other business records on back-up
tapes. However, recent case law indicates continued expansion of the type of data and medium of data storage
involved in discovery. As demonstrated by court-ordered preservation and production of server logs in Bunnell,
the development of technology has led to a broader definition of what constitutes “electronically stored
information.” This expansion includes both standard data, as well as “metadata.”71  Indeed, in recent years,
courts have continued to find that metadata “is subject to the duty of preservation and is discoverable,72  and
may require its production through load files or a native format.73  Metadata’s valuable role in authenticating
documents and in proving how, when, and where electronic information was created indicates its value to
litigation and likely continued use.74
<29>In addition, and as was previously noted, data kept on server logs is also discoverable.75  Files kept in online
Web browser cache folders also have been subject to discovery requests when relevant for proving what Web
sites were visited by defendants.76  Even Web server logs containing user information similar to those used by
the defendant in Bunnell have previously been subject to discovery.77  Nevertheless, all of these developments
are tempered by the requirement of relevancy and standards of reasonable accessibility.
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<30>More specifically, the changes made in the 2006 amendments discussed above confirm the significance of
reasonable measures in producing electronically stored information. In addition to the two-category model of
reasonable accessible and inaccessible data, courts may consider a number of factors before requiring a party to
produce data that the party has identified as inaccessible.78  Although the Rules Committee crafted the
amendments to allow for changes in discoverable information,79  the Rules Committee also made it clear that the
standards of reasonability would remain the same. It remains clear that if a requesting party believes that
reasonably foreseeable evidence was intentionally destroyed after litigation, a court may sanction the responding
party only if there is some proof that the evidence was relevant.80  However, even before the addition of the
“safe harbor” amendment, courts did not penalize defendants for destroying data when acting consistently with
their routine destruction policy.81
<31>Finally, discovery requests that appear to be “fishing expeditions” continue to be frowned upon by the courts,
as they likely do not satisfy the “good cause” requirement for ordering production of burdensome requests.82
Similarly, courts have established that the duty to preserve generally entails suspending the use of a routine
document destruction policy rather than implementing new methods of recording and storing data.83  Although
the scope of discoverable information will continue to broaden as the courts’ understanding of electronically
stored information expands, e-discovery obligations continue to be tempered by standards of reasonability.
The Importance of a Sound Litigation Hold Procedures and Data Destruction Policies
<32>Providing another valuable lesson for attorneys and their business clients, the court order in Bunnell
reinforces the importance of reasonable preservation and destruction policies, and a strict adherence to those
policies by employees. TorrentSpy and its affiliates had the means to record its user data in its server logs, and
were ordered by the court to start preserving this data for production during discovery.84  TorrentSpy was not
penalized for failing to use the logging method prior to litigation, but rather because of a finding of subsequent
and intentional spoliation of the evidence that had been ordered preserved.85
<33>Furthermore, Bunnell provides a reminder of the importance and limitations of the Federal Rules’ “safe
harbor” provision. As discussed above, the “safe harbor” clause of the 2006 amendments protects the good-faith
destruction of primarily temporary electronic information (like that stored in RAM) when done in adherence with
an existing destruction policy prior to litigation.86  Information officers at organizations are just now beginning to
appreciate the value of adhering to these policies,87  and studies show that many executives are now recognizing
the need to better understand their company’s approach to preservation and destruction.88  Several Web sites
and organizations offer advice on developing policies appropriate to different business models and guidelines for
sticking to these policies.89  Information officers and attorneys alike, however, should take notice that the safe
harbor does not protect against destruction of evidence once the duty of preservation has been activated.
CONCLUSION
<34>As technology continues to develop new modes of communication and new ways to create and store
information, civil litigation will certainly reflect these changes by making more types of stored information subject
to discovery. However, this expansion will still be restrained by the Federal Rules’ standards of reasonability.
Although Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell indicates that a familiar medium of computer memory may now
play a greater role in litigation, it should not be construed as requiring new and expensive policies for
7
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preservation and destruction of data. Organizations acting in good faith and with reasonable methods of
preservation can continue to do so without fear, at least where there is no anticipation of pending litigation. By
developing and sticking to sound data retention policies—and by having effective and fully implemented litigation
hold procedures—companies will continue to survive the requirements of e-discovery.
PRACTICE POINTERS
Evaluate the potential discovery liabilities unique to different business models and the electronic
information generated by such business, similar to those unique challenges highlighted by TorrentSpy
in Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell.
Develop comprehensive data destruction/preservation policies and educate employees on how these
policies are put on hold when litigation becomes reasonably foreseeable.
Preserve reasonably foreseeable evidence that may be found to be relevant by a court, when litigation
has commenced or is reasonably anticipated to begin.
Reasonably foreseeable evidence may include traditional forms of electronic information such as e-
mails and back-ups, but may also include cached files, visit logs and meta-data necessary to
authenticate other types of discoverable evidence.
Review and become familiar with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the various types of data
that are now subject to discovery.
When filing discovery requests, specifically target certain types of discoverable electronic information
to ensure disclosure and more efficacious administration of discovery issues by the courts.
Educate companies and their employees about changes in the law with regard to novel types of
electronically discoverable evidence.
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